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Abstract 
 
Binding specificity​ is a centrally important concept in molecular biology, yet it has 
received little philosophical attention. Here I aim to remedy this by analyzing binding 
specificity as a causal property. I focus on the concept’s role in drug design, where it is 
highly prized and hence directly studied: From a causal perspective, understanding why 
binding specificity is a valuable property of drugs contributes to an understanding of 
causal selection​ーof how and why scientists distinguish between causes, not just causes 
from non-causes. In particular, the specificity of drugs is precisely what underwrites their 
value as experimental interventions on biological processes. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Nothing in molecular biology makes sense except in the light of specificity . Trainees in 1
the field learn from the very beginning that the function of a biomoleculeーof proteins in 
particularーis critically tied to its structure. In turn, that structure-function relationship is 
understood in terms of the molecule’s ability to interact preferentially, or ​specifically​, 
with certain other entities while avoiding others. Specificity of this kind applies to a wide 
variety of interactions between biomolecules: between enzymes and their substrates, 
transcription factors and their DNA binding sites, between antibodies and the antigens 
they recognize, and to DNA-DNA and DNA-RNA interactions, to name a few. It is 
because of specific interactions like these that biological processes can be precisely 
regulated and organized in space and time, giving rise to the complexity and variety of 
life and its preservation within and across generations. I will refer to this property as 
binding specificity​. 
For such a centrally important concept, binding specificity has received 
surprisingly little philosophical attention. While all philosophers of molecular biology are 
certainly aware of it, it is usually mentioned only in passing, such as in the course of 
explicating other concepts such as arbitrariness (Stegmann 2004) or information (Sarkar 
2005; Griffiths et al. 2015). Perhaps most notably, it is not among the three concepts 
(“mechanism”, “information”, and “gene”) that have their own sections in the current 
1 This is, of course, a variation on a famous statement by Dobzhansky (1973). 
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“Molecular Biology” entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia (Tabery et al. 2015). There, 
specificity in the binding sense is mentioned on two occasions: once during its account of 
DNA replication, and once as a historical term that was later “replaced” by talk of 
information. As these examples show, binding specificity has almost exclusively been 
confined to the background in philosophical discussions. 
This claim may come as a surprise to some, since “specificity” has been the direct 
focus of a debate in the philosophy of biology for the last decade (Waters 2007; Weber 
2006,2017; Woodward 2010; Griffiths and Stotz 2013; Griffiths et al. 2015; Stotz and 
Griffiths 2017). That debate is primarily centred around the issue of gene centrismーthe 
question of whether, and to what extent, we can attribute to genes a privileged causal or 
explanatory role in development relative to non-genetic factors. The most recent iteration 
of this debate is whether genes’ role in development is more “causally specific”, at least 
with respect to protein synthesis. 
However, the specificity concept discussed in that literatureーwhat is sometimes 
called ​fine-grained​ causal specificityーis markedly different to the concept of binding 
specificity that is of interest here. A causal relationship is highly specific in the 
fine-grained sense to the extent that a large number of interventions on the cause each 
produce a unique effect (see Woodward 2010). By contrast, a simple on-off light switch
ーwith only two states of the cause and two of the effectーis a very ​non-​specific 
relationship in this sense. Yet there are many such switch-like causal relationships in 
biological systems which nevertheless rely on mechanisms involving highly specific 
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binding interactions. Since switch-like relationships are very non-specific in the 
fine-grained sense, this suggests that the specificity of these interactions is not captured 
by the fine-grained causal specificity conceptーeven if the two are related in interesting 
ways, as I will discuss. 
I do not wish to claim that philosophers have mistakenly conflated these two 
notions; in fact, they often take care to distinguish the two (e.g. Griffiths et al. 2015). Nor 
do I mean to criticise this focus on fine-grained specificity, which is quite reasonable in 
the context of the long-running debate on gene-centrism. Nevertheless, a consequence of 
this focus is that binding specificity has fallen by the wayside in the philosophical 
literature, and so inductees to the field may form the incorrect impression that 
fine-grained specificity is the most, even the ​only​ important kind of specificity for 
biology. The primary purpose of this paper is to argue that binding specificity is, or 
should be, as interesting to philosophers of biology as it is important to biology itselfーat 
least as important as the fine-grained variety. There are certainly complex dependencies 
between these two concepts that are worth exploring (see Bourrat 2019); however, the 
aim of this paper is not primarily one of comparison. Instead, its main goal is to show that 
binding specificity is philosophically interesting in its own right, and to scratch the 
surface of a philosophical analysis of the concept that I hope will be continued. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides an account of binding 
specificity as a scientific concept; in particular, of the way it is understood in the practice 
of drug design. Section 3 then develops a philosophical account of binding specificity as a 
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causal​ concept of the sort discussed by Woodward (2010). It then connects binding 
specificity so construed to the issue of ​causal selection​ーthe practice of singling out one 
or more causes of an outcome as being “the” cause, or of particular relevance or 
importance. I give a number of reasons why scientists often value high binding 
specificity, and select causes on that basis. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Binding Specificity in Drug Design 
 
The idea of specificityーthat a chemical substance could act selectively on certain tissues 
and avoid othersーwas first formed in the 1870s by Paul Ehrlich, who noticed that certain 
dyes stained only particular parts of a cell. Ehrlich later realized that this discriminate 
activity might be put to work not just in staining but also for therapeutic purposes. So was 
born the science of drug discovery and its ideal of a “magic bullet”ーa drug that 
selectively targets a disease while leaving everything else in the body untouched (Ehrlich 
1910,1911; Strebhardt and Ullrich 2008). Ehrlich’s vision of therapeutic magic bullets 
survives to this day: in the modern molecular picture of drug action, a key criterion for a 
good drug is the specificity with which it binds to its target, avoiding interactions with 
unwanted “decoys”. While it is not the only relevant criterion, binding specificity is a 
critical point of evaluation for the discovery and design of biologically active molecules. 
While it is part of the conceptual furniture throughout the molecular biological 
sciences, drug design’s direct interest in binding specificity has produced an especially 
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sophisticated understanding of itーof what it is, what contributes to it and, most 
importantly, how to get it. This makes the field of drug design an ideal place to look in 
search of a clear understanding of binding specificity. 
This will require a considerable narrowing of focus, and so I should note from the 
beginning what is being left out. First, I will deal exclusively with binding interactions 
between drugs that are small moleculesーknown as ​ligands​ーand a protein. I therefore 
leave aside cases where the drug target is not a proteinーsuch as chelating agents that 
bind to metal poisons. This also excludes many kinds of molecular interaction to which 
the concept of binding specificity also applies, such as DNA-DNA and DNA-RNA 
interactions. While I will not discuss these, I take the associated specificity concept to be 
essentially the same, and so I intend what follows to be broadly applicable to those as 
well. I will also restrict discussion to cases where the disease etiology (its underlying 
causal process at the molecular level) is at least partly known, and hence where a 
potential target for drug intervention has been identified, and where the aim is to develop 
a drug that acts on that chosen target to achieve a desired effect. This leaves out much of 
interest about how the disease etiology is elucidated in the first place (see Darden et al. 
2018). 
 
2.1 Specificity and Affinity 
 
 
8 
The philosophical analysis of binding specificity that I’m undertaking here is a broadly 
pragmatic one: it aims to understand the role that the concept plays in the achievement of 
specified scientific aims. Such an analysis should, among other things, locate that concept 
in the broader context in which it plays such a role. As it happens, there is another key 
notion at work in drug designーthe notion of ​affinity​ーwhich is not just related to binding 
specificity but embedded within it, making it especially important to this analysis. This 
section is therefore dedicated to an explication of affinity and its relationship with binding 
specificity. 
Affinity refers to the strength of the binding interaction between any two 
molecules. Consider a binding interaction between a ligand (drug) ​L​, and a target protein 
P​. (By definition, a “ligand” for a protein is a small molecule that binds to that protein). ​P 
and ​L​ bind reversibly to form a ​complex​, ​PL​: 
 
 P  ⇆ P LL +   
 
Mixed together in the right solution, ​L​ and ​P​ will reach a dynamic equilibrium​ ​in which 
the rate of binding and dissociation are equal. As we increase the concentration of ​L​ in the 
solution, more and more of ​P​ will be bound to and occupied by ​L​ at this equilibrium, until 
there is virtually no free ​P ​ left. The stronger the interactionーthe higher its affinityーthe 
more readily the complex ​PL ​will form as the concentration of ​L​ is increased. A common 
measure of affinity, the “dissociation constant” K​D​, gives the concentration of ​L ​at which 
there is as much bound protein as free protein (Schasfoort et al. 2012; see figure 1); that 
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is, the value of [​L​] at which [​PL​]=[​P​]. (The notation “[​X​]” denotes the ​concentration ​of 
X​.) Hence, a low K​D​ value indicates a high affinity. This value is particularly important to 
drug design because it affects the required dosage: a relatively high-affinity drug will 
require a relatively low dosage to achieve the same effect. 
What makes one pair of molecules bind with higher affinity than another? That is, 
what are the ​difference-makers​ (Waters 2007) for binding affinity? To answer this, it is 
important to understand that, thermodynamically speaking, molecules do not generally 
“like” to be bound together: complex formation produces an ordered and hence 
low-entropy state, and so most pairings are highly ephemeral. For two molecules to 
undergo sustained interaction there is a debt of entropy to be paid, by freeing other 
molecules or energy into the surrounding environment. Pairs of molecules bind with high 
affinity when they succeed at paying this debt. 
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Figure 1. A dissociation curve relating the proportion of bound protein to total ligand 
concentration. 
 
There are several factors that contribute to this thermodynamic book-balancing. 
The first is the “fit” between the binding surfaces of the respective molecules, both in 
terms of their three-dimensional shape (stereochemistry) and the distribution of 
electrostatic charge (electrochemistry). Attraction between opposite charges releases 
energy; the stronger the opposite charges, and the closer the proximity, the more energy is 
released and hence the more thermodynamically favourable the binding. Another factor 
affecting affinity is desolvationーthe expulsion of bound water molecules in the course of 
complex formation (Huggins et al. 2012). Finally, a less commonly-acknowledged 
contributor to affinity is the flexibility or rigidity of the macromolecules involved: if a 
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molecule is highly flexible, binding interactions restrict its degrees of freedom and make 
its bound state less favourable. Hence, two molecules with virtually identical binding 
surfaces may nevertheless bind a target with different affinities if one is more rigid than 
the other (Eaton et al. 1995, Carothers et al. 2006). 
With the above account in mind, how does binding affinity relate to binding 
specificity​? The crucial point is that, as we’ll see below, high affinity is not sufficient to 
make a binding interaction specific. While affinity refers just to the strength with which a 
ligand binds its target, specificity refers to “the degree of discrimination expressed by a 
ligand” for its target (Kangas and Tidor 2000, 9121), or “functional discrimination 
between molecules competing for a common ligand” (Eaton et al. 1995). In short, a 
specific drug binds to its target not just strongly but preferentially. 
This leads us to a simple way of understanding the relationship between these two 
concepts: binding specificity can usefully be understood as ​relative affinity​. Affinity is 
comparatively simple: it applies to a dyadic relationship, the binding interaction between 
a ligand and its target (though this is not symmetricalーthe affinity of ​P​ for ​L ​is not equal 
to the affinity of ​L​ for ​P​). Binding ​specificity​, on the other hand, is the affinity of a ligand 
for its target relative to its affinity for decoys. Because of this, quantifying binding 
specificity requires defining a range of targets and decoys among which relative affinities 
are being measured. There are different ways of doing this: a canonical treatment of 
binding specificity by von Hippel and Berg (1986, adapted by Eaton et al. 1995) 
quantifies it as the ratio of ligand bound to the target versus the sum total of all ligand 
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bound to “background” sites. Others (e.g. Carothers et al. 2006) quantify specificity for a 
target relative to a single other species. Different measures suit different purposes; in any 
case, quantifying the specificity of a ligand requires reference to ​at least one​ binding 
partner other than the target in question. A drug that is specific against one background 
may therefore be nonspecific in another, while the affinity for its target may stay the 
same. 
There is a final complication to binding specificity that will become relevant in 
what follows, which is that it is often desirable for a drug to act on more than one protein
ーto a family of related proteins, for instance. Cases like these call for ​broad specificity 
(Huggins et al. 2012) ; that is, specificity for some defined ​range ​of targets. While 2
specificity for a range of proteins may seem paradoxical, the drug may still discriminate 
between those targets and another range of decoys. Like the difference between a garden 
plant and a weed, what makes a given protein a target or a decoy is purely a matter of 
whether that interaction is desirable for a given purpose. In many cases, then, specificity 
is not just relative to a given background but defined partly by ​value judgments​ that 
2 Huggins et al. actually use the term “selectivity” here instead of “specificity”. I 
retain the latter term for consistency. Pharmacologists often distinguish these two ideasー
“selectivity” referring to side-effects or lack thereof at the clinical level rather than 
binding at the molecular level. However, in this case Huggins et al. are evidently 
attributing “selectivity” to molecular-level binding interactions. 
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distinguish “good” and “bad” interactions, and hence “broad” specificity from merely 
poor specificity. 
 
2.2 How to Design Specific Drugs: Experiments and Heuristics 
 
The previous section presents part of the problem space in the process of drug design. 
What kinds of strategy do scientists use in navigating this problem space? The range of 
approaches are, of course, too numerous to list here. I will restrict discussion to a few, 
which divide into ​empirical ​ and ​rational​ methods. 
Empirical methods are those that reveal candidate drugs primarily through 
experiment. One example is Systematic Evolution of Ligands by Exponential Enrichment, 
or SELEX (Eaton et al. 1995). SELEX involves a selection process on large arrays of 
aptamers​ーstrings of DNA or RNA which, like proteins, can fold three-dimensionally to 
produce structures that undergo specific binding. The basic principle behind SELEX is to 
1) select from these aptamers according to how well they bind to a chosen target, 2) 
amplify and systematically vary those selected variants, and 3) repeat.  
However, there is a practical drawback to this technique: Being an ​in vitro 
process, it isn’t possible to directly select aptamers bind specifically to their target from 
the full, messy physiological background of the human body. However, Eaton et al. 
describe an experimental heuristic that they find to be effective: by selecting directly for 
high affinityーwhich, as we’ve seen, is not dependent on backgroundーspecificity tends 
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to come for free. Beside past experience, they also offer theoretical reasons why the two 
should tend to coincide: increased affinity for a target comes largely from increasing 
exactness of fit between the interacting species, and it is likely that changes in the 
aptamer that increase the fit for its target will decrease the fit for background decoys. 
As with all heuristics, however, this has limitations; its reliability depends on the 
robustness of the relationship between specificity and affinity, and as we’ve seen the two 
do not necessarily coincide. Some have offered counterexamples in which this heuristic 
breaks down: Carothers et al. (2006) find that selecting for high-affinity binding to GTP 
does not tend to increase specificity against chemically similar GTP analogs. Instead, they 
suggest that specificity in this case is gained, not from improving intermolecular 
interactions, but from the stability of the ​intra​molecular forces of the aptamer, since a 
more flexible molecule with more degrees of freedom is better able to deform to 
accommodate the analogs’ chemical differences. Huggins et al. (2012) offer another 
counterexample, finding that reducing affinity for decoys often requires changes that 
reduce affinity for the target as well. 
The general lesson here is this: whether high target affinity begets high specificity 
is heavily dependent on context, including the ranges of desirable and undesirable targets 
and the similarities and differences between them. 
 
2.3 How to Design Specific Drugs: Rational Principles 
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As well as empirical methods of drug discovery such as SELEX, there are also what are 
called ​rational ​ approaches to drug designー“rational” in the sense of being driven largely 
by prediction based on theoretical principles rather than by experimental techniques. 
Huggins et al. (2012) detail a range of such approaches: By considering 1) the properties 
contributing to affinity and specificity in general, 2) the details of the structure of the 
ligand-target complex, and 3) the similarities and differences in those properties between 
targets and decoys, it is possible to make educated guesses about how to improve the 
specificity of drug treatments by altering their chemical structures. Those similarities and 
differences reveal “handles” that are potentially exploitable for attaining selectivity goals 
by adding, removing, or changing certain chemical groups. These handles include the 
following: 
 
1. Shape complementarity: Crystal structures of targets and decoys sometimes reveal 
a difference in the shape of the active siteーoften of only a single amino acid 
residue. Cases like these invite the design of a drug that fits easily into the target 
site but clashes with the equivalent site on the decoy. 
2. Electrostatic complementarity: Electrostatic forces change exponentially with 
distance, which makes them ripe for exploitation for selectivity purposes. This 
includes both positive design (developing molecules that interact especially well 
with targets) or negative design (creating clashes with decoys that are tolerated by 
targets). 
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3. Flexibility: As we’ve seen, despite the similarities in binding sites, ligands can be 
designed to favour the target if that target is more deformable than decoys. This 
can be done by designing a ligand that binds to the target’s ​deformed ​state, rather 
than the state that it has in common with the more rigid decoy (e.g. Liu and Gray. 
2006). 
4. Hydrophobic effects: Sometimes a target and decoy will differ in how strongly 
they bind to a water molecule when unbound. If the decoy binds the water more 
strongly than does the target, displacing that water from the decoy will be less 
favourable, and so the drug’s affinity for the decoy relative to the target will be 
reduced. 
5. Allosteric pockets and non-competitive binding: A simple way to inhibit a target 
and avoid decoys is to target an ​allosteric​ site (a binding site other than the active 
site) that the target has while the decoys do not. 
 
The above sets out just some of what is philosophically interesting about 
specificity and its role in drug design: It reveals problems faced and solutions found by 
scientists with well-defined practical goals, and the role played by concepts such as 
specificity in working towards achieving them. For one, the real but tenuous link between 
specificity and affinity affords the use of a simple but exception-ridden heuristicーone 
that works in some cases but breaks down in others. Secondly, the complexities of 
specificity profiles and the rational approaches for optimizing them demonstrate the value 
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of understanding the difference-makers that are relevant to one’s particular contextーfor 
example, the ranges of desirable targets and undesirable decoys and their shared and 
contrasting features. With the above account of binding specificity in hand, we can now 
investigate the lessons these issues hold for philosophers interested in causation. 
 
3. Binding Specificity and Causation 
 
The previous section outlined the role of the concept of binding specificity in drug design
ーwhy it matters, how is defined and quantified, and the methods scientists use in their 
search for drugs that possess it. Here I will explore how these lessons may be of interest 
to philosophers interested in causation in biology. 
In particular, the theoretical importance of specificity to drug design, and the 
explicit practical motivations for reasoning about it, may inform philosophical discussion 
about ​causal selection​. Causal selection refers to a cluster of philosophical issues 
surrounding the following observation: While any given event in the world has, strictly 
speaking, many or even infinitely many causes, we tend to select or single out only one or 
a few of these as being “the” cause of that event (Hesslow 1988). Philosophers since Mill 
(1874) have doubted that any principled rationale can be given for this phenomenon, 
given how context-sensitive and “capricious” it appears to be. However, philosophers in 
recent times have challenged this widespread pessimism: As elaborated below, 
Woodward (2010) argues that as well as distinguishing causes from non-causes in 
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biology, causal relationships can themselves differ in a variety of properties. What’s 
more, these properties can be more or less conducive to a variety of practical goals.  
My aim in this section is to expand on Woodward’s discussion of specificity as a 
basis for causal selection, using lessons about its use in the field of drug design detailed 
above. Drug design offers a highly tractable case study for this purpose: As we’ve seen, 
the field has explicit practical goals, and it explicitly selects drugs based (partly) on 
binding specificity precisely because it is conducive to those goals. Hence, if we can 
interpret binding specificity as a causal property, then the various reasons why it is valued 
in drug design constitute a range of scientific justifications for causal selection.  My aim 
in this section is to develop this line of thought. 
As an aside, the reader may have the following objection: In cases of causal 
selection discussed in the literature so far, there are a large number of causes that jointly 
produce a given effect (such as a phenotype), and the question is why we tend to single 
out one or a subset of those causes (such as genes) from among the full complement of 
factors that interact to produce the outcome. In drug design, in contrast, what scientists 
are selecting between are alternative candidates for playing the ​same ​causal role. Because 
of this, one might object that this doesn’t count as a case of causal selection at all. It is 
certainly worth keeping in mind that the type of “selection” being done in this context is 
markedly different. However, I take a central explanandum in discussions of causal 
selection to be as follows: As well as distinguishing causes from non-causes, scientists 
also distinguish ​between causes​ based on further features in which they differ. Hence, if 
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binding specificity can be understood as a causal property, then the fact that drugs with 
this property tend to be favoured more than those without it still constitutes an instance of 
the phenomenon that we’re aiming to understand. 
A final potential objection: My discussion follows Woodward in discussing causes 
and causal selection from an ​interventionist ​perspective . It should be acknowledged that 3
this approach has popular rivals. Most significantly, interventionism is often contrasted 
with a ​mechanistic ​accounts (Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000; Glennan 2017): On 
these accounts, a causal understanding of a biological phenomenon centrally concerns 
discovering its underlying mechanisms. In contrast, my discussion will treat causal 
relations in terms of the manipulability of an effect by intervention on its causes. For 
some, this interventionist approach misses much of what is important the scientific 
investigation of biological phenomena, especially at the molecular level. I should 
therefore take some time to place the following discussion in context with this debate.  
I am sympathetic to claims that the interventionist approach, especially its use of 
causal graphs that I’ll be employing, is not omnipotent as a means of clarifying the full 
range of explanatorily salient features of molecular processes (Kaiser 2016). Despite this, 
however, I take the viewーwhich I cannot defend in full hereーthat mechanistic and 
interventionist approaches deal with different but equally important dimensions of 
biological reasoning and practice. Mechanistic considerations certainly play a critical role 
3 An alternative account of causal selection to Woodward’s can be found in             
(Franklin-Hall 2015). I lack the space for a comparison between these two accounts here. 
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in drug design’s understanding of specificity: As detailed in section 2.3, rational 
approaches centrally depend on a detailed understanding of the mechanisms by which the 
drug binds to its target and decoys (see Darden et al. 2018). This kind of mechanistic 
understanding is clearly valuable for understanding and improving drug specificity in 
some contexts. 
Even so, it is evident from what we’ve seen that binding specificity ​itself ​is 
quantifiable without reference to these mechanistic details. In other words, specificity is 
multiply realizable: the same end can be achieved through a variety of mechanistic 
means. Because of this, specificity as a quantity offers a common currency by which to 
evaluate otherwise different types of binding interaction for a variety of practical 
purposes. More generally, this shows that it is possible to distinguish causal relations 
from each other in ways that abstract from their underlying mechanisms, and in many 
contextsーthough certainly not allーit is useful to do so. Instead, we can differentiate 
causal relations in terms of the way they respond to various external manipulations. At 
the same time, I acknowledge that there is much interesting work to be done in exploring 
how the mechanistic understanding of disease processes may further illuminate the 
causal, practical, and epistemic dimensions of specificity. 
 
3.1 Binding Specificity as a Causal Property 
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Here we come to the first key question: can binding specificity, as elaborated in section 2, 
be interpreted as a causal property in the interventionist sense discussed by Woodward 
(2010)? There, Woodward argues that causal relations in biology vary along three 
different dimensions: ​stability​, ​proportionality​, and ​specificity​. A natural starting point, 
then, is to see whether the notion of binding specificity in drug design can be interpreted 
as an instance of this third property of causal specificity.  
Importantly, there are in fact two different senses of causal specificity highlighted 
in that work: The first is the aforementioned fine-grained sense of specificity discussed in 
section 1ーthe degree to which a variety of interventions on the cause uniquely specify a 
range of values of the effect. The second sense is one that “seems prima-facie rather 
different”: the idea “that a causal relationship is specific to the extent that a single (type 
of) cause produces only a single (type of) effect and to the extent that each single type of 
effect is produced only by a (type of) single cause.” (​ibid. ​308). In contrast, a causal 
relationship is non-specific in this sense either if the cause produces many other effects, 
or if the effect is also brought about by many other causes. I will henceforth call this 
one-one specificity​. 
As discussed above, it is difficult to interpret binding specificity as causal 
specificity in the fine-grained sense, since even binary switch-like causal relationshipsー
which are very non-specific in the fine-grained senseーrely on highly specific binding 
interactions. This suggests that the one-one variety may be better-suited to a causal 
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analysis of binding specificity. Woodward appears to agree, as evidenced in his 
discussion of enzyme-substrate interactions: 
 
Enzymes are commonly described as ‘‘very specific’’ with respect to the 
substrates on which they act and the reactions they catalyze. This is usually 
understood to mean that a particular enzyme will often act only [on] a 
particular substrate or a small set of these (rather than a large class of 
different substrates) and that it will catalyze just one kind of reaction with 
this substrate. In other words, the smaller the number of different substrates 
an enzyme can bind, the greater its ‘‘specificity’’. (Woodward 2010, 309) 
 
Since the action of an enzyme on its substrate begins with their binding to form a 
complex, it is evident that Woodward is interpreting (what I here call) binding specificity 
as an instance of one-one causal specificity. I proceed in broad agreement with this claim; 
however, the complexities of specificity in drug design as discussed in section 2 call for 
some elaboration and refinements. 
The first step is to specify exactly what causes are standing in such one-one 
relationships in the case of binding interactions between molecules. For Woodward, 
cause-effect relationships are (or can be represented as) relationships between ​variables​, 
each with two or more ​values​. For example, to represent a causal relationship between a 
light switch and light bulb, we need to define a variable for eachーsay, ​X​={switch on, 
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switch off} and ​Y​={light on, light off}. Given that, we can represent the causal 
relationship between the two in directed graph form: 
X→Y 
The arrow represents the claim “​X ​ causes ​Y​”. The meaning of this claim is that there are 
ideal interventions​ on ​Xー​surgical, exogenous manipulations of ​X​’s valueーthat would 
change ​Y​ (see Woodward 2010 for more detail). 
With this in mind, there is work to be done towards interpreting binding 
specificity as an (interventionist) causal concept. First of all, translating binding 
specificity into a causal property requires us to define precisely the variables and their 
values to which the concept of binding specificity applies. Here there seems to be a 
problem: we saw in the previous section that binding specificity is predicated of the 
binding of a ligand with a target biomolecule (or between two molecular species more 
generally). But molecules are apparently ​entities​, not variables, and so they are not the 
sort of thing that can stand in causal relations in the interventionist sense.  What, then, are 
the variables whose causal relation can be described as more or less one-one specific? 
Section 2 suggests that we should begin with a causal interpretation of binding 
affinity​, since specificity is in effect relative affinity. As we’ve seen (figure 1), affinity is 
derived from a dissociation curve relating total ligand ​concentration ​[​L​]​total​ and proportion 
of occupied target sites [​PL ​]/[​P​]​total​. This reflects the fact that varying the ligand 
concentration causes changes in the proportion of bound targetーa clear causal 
relationship between variables in the interventionist sense. Hence, we can interpret 
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affinity as a property of the causal relation [​L​]​total​→[​PL​]/[​P​]​total​. (To simplify, I will 
henceforth use the value [​PL​] as the effect variable, rather than [​PL​]/[​P​]​total​; the resulting 
causal relation remains true). 
Some clarification is needed at this point: My aim here is not to clarify the ​causes 
of specificity​. If it were, it would be necessary to treat affinity not as a property of 
relations between causal variables but as a causal variable in itself: that is, if the affinity 
K​D​ of a binding interaction is an effect, what are its causes? The answers to this question 
include the properties listed in section 2.3: for example, mutations affecting the flexibility 
of the target protein will sometimes change the affinity of the binding interaction. Instead, 
my aim here is to understand binding specificity as ​a causal property​; that is, as a 
property of causal relations, not as an effect that has causes. My motivation for doing so 
is to understand how binding specificity relates to other causal properties, and to discuss 
how and why these factors are conducive to scientists’ practical and epistemic aims. 
Again, this is not so say that the concrete mechanistic details of binding interactions are 
not important tout court; they are simply orthogonal to the particular question at issue 
here. 
Now that we have established affinity as a causal property, the next step is to 
derive from it a similarly causal version of binding ​specificity​: If the affinity of ​L​ for ​P 
pertains to the causal relation [​L​]​total​→[​PL​], and if binding specificity amounts to relative 
affinity, then binding specificity as a causal property should be a comparison between that 
relation and the equivalent relations with some range of decoys. As we saw, there are 
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different ways of picking out this range: by picking out a single one, for example, or 
including the full range of other proteins to which the ligand can bind in a given 
physiological environment. As Woodward acknowledges, “a great deal will turn on how 
this restricted range is specified” (2010,​ ​311). For simplicity I will focus on the case of a 
single target ​P​ and a single decoy ​D​. Hence, the causal relations being compared are those 
between ligand concentration [​L​]​total​ and the formation of complexes [​PL​] and [​DL​] (see 
figure 2). 
We can now begin to elaborate on Woodward’s proposal that binding specificity 
is an instance of one-one causal specificityーthat it implies a single cause producing a 
single effect, and a single effect arising from a single cause. Take, for example, the claim 
“ligand ​L​ is highly specific for its target ​P​ relative to decoy ​D​”ーcall this claim “Spec” 
for short. How exactly might we interpret Spec in a way that involves a one-to-one causal 
relationship? 
At this point we can see some complications. First, we cannot take Spec to mean 
that the ligand binds to the target exclusively. Woodward acknowledges this (2010, 312), 
while leaving open how exactly we are to interpret the one-one specificity claim instead. 
One solution may be to impose some threshold affinity below which a decoy interaction 
can be ignored, which may be chosen differently depending on context. Another possible 
solution, somewhat less context-sensitive, is analogous to the move from deterministic to 
probabilistic causation: Rather than a function relating causes to unique effects, we can 
simply consider the ​distribution​ of ligand between target and decoy; for example, the 
 
26 
ratio [​PL​]/[​DL​]. Sure enough, for a highly specific ligand that distribution will be heavily 
weighted towards the target, whereas the distribution will be flatter for a relatively 
non-specific ligand. This interpretation honours the fact that specificity is a matter of 
degree, with “ideal” specificityーa strict one-one relationshipーbeing just that: an ideal 
that is never actually attained. 
 
Figure 2: The affinity of L for P is a feature of the causal relation [​L​]​total​→[​PL​]. Since 
specificity is relative affinity, specificity should be a matter of comparison between that 
and at least one other binding relationーsay, with a decoy ​D ​. 
There is another qualification to add: However preferentially ​L​ binds to ​P​, Spec 
does not imply that ​only L​ can bind to ​P​ in this way. That is, Spec does not rule out the 
idea that ​another ​ligand ​L* ​ can also bind ​P ​with high affinity. So while Spec may rule out 
a one-to-many relationship between cause and effect, it is compatible with a many-to-one 
relationship. However, recall that binding interactions are in an important sense 
symmetrical: Neither ​L​ nor ​P ​ is “the” cause of binding: we can just as easily hold [​L​] 
fixed and consider the causal relationship [​P​]→[​PL​]. The specificity of ​that​ relationship 
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is indeed threatened by the presence of the rival ligand ​L​*. In short, whether a binding 
interaction is specific depends on which of the entities we treat as the target. Because of 
this, we may only require a slight amendment to Woodward’s claim, from a conjunction 
to a disjunction: Binding specificity implies that a cause produces only one effect OR that 
an effect is only produced by one cause, depending on which of the interacting entities we 
treat as the cause and which the effect. Interestingly, this difference in perspective may 
underlie a further distinction that scientists appear to make: between specific ​action​ and 
specific ​recognition​. This question and its potential significance will be addressed in 
future work. 
Setting these issues aside, section 2 has raised another complexity to binding 
specificity that a causal interpretation would do well to accommodate: the idea of ​broad 
specificity. It is often desirable to design a drug with the right specificity “profile”ーone 
that binds to a range of desirable targets while still avoiding undesirable ones. So far we 
lack a way of accounting for the difference between drugs with this broad specificity and 
ones that are simply indiscriminate. How might we incorporate broad specificity into the 
emerging causal account? 
I suggest that Woodward’s (2010) notion of ​proportionality ​provides a solution. 
Briefly, a causal explanation for some effect is proportional to that effect to the extent that 
it includes relevant information and excludes irrelevant information about the causal 
relation in question. When citing smoking as a cause of lung cancer, for example, we 
generally don’t care to specify which brand of cigarettes is smoked. Why do we typically 
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favour the claim that smoking causes cancer over the claim that smoking Pall Malls 
causes cancer, even though both are strictly true? The difference is that the latter claim 
omits relevant information: it does not negate, say, the false proposition that one could 
avoid cancer by switching to Marlboros. In general, then, proportionality guides our 
choice of the ​grain​ of the variables being related: their values should be selected to 
contain all and only the relevant information about which interventions would make a 
difference to the outcome . 4
With that in mind, a possible way of accounting for specificity profiles might be 
to group desirable targets and undesirable decoys into single values, then compare the 
extent to which the ligand affects each of them taken together (see figure 3). This follows 
4 Franklin-Hall (2016) critiques Woodward’s treatment of proportionality on the          
basis that it cannot avoid recommending variables of a vacuously high level, i.e. radical              
disjunctions of possible causes of a given effect. I lack the space to address this criticism                
in detail. In brief, I think there are in fact very good reasons not to allow disjunctive                 
variables of this kind: Variables in causal models should have values that are mutually              
exclusive, i.e. that cannot be manipulated independently of each other. See Woodward,            
“Response to Franklin-Hall and Weslake on Stability and Proportionality” (Unpublished          
manuscript, 
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14117/1/Response%20to%20Franklin-Hall%20and%20Wes
lake.docx) 
 
29 
the principle of proportionality because it groups values whose differences are taken to be 
irrelevant, or at least less relevant: the aim is to bind ​all​ targets and avoid ​all​ decoys. 
 
Figure 3: Variables can be grouped through the principle of proportionality to 
accommodate broad specificity. We can arrange the binding interactions into “targets” 
and “decoys”ー​P​1​-​P​3​ and ​D​1​-​D​3​ーbased on whether those interactions are desirable. We 
can then group binding interactions with targets and decoys separately, and measure the 
specificity of ​L​ for one set over the other. (Here I part from the convention of causal 
graphs by weighting the arrows to represent varying affinities.) 
 
There is more to be said about how the proposed causal interpretation of binding 
specificity will require adjustments and nuances based on context. However, the version 
presented captures at least some of the important features of binding specificity revealed 
in section 2, and provides the beginnings of a way to translate what was found there into a 
 
30 
case study for how scientists choose between drugs based on their different causal 
properties. We now move on to an exploration of the purposes guiding that selection 
process. 
 
3.2 Binding Specificity as a Rationale for Causal Selection 
 
Woodward’s discussion of differences between causal relations has an explicitly 
pragmatic aim: The point is not simply that there ​exist​ differences between causes of a 
given effect in terms of properties like stability, specificity and proportionality; it’s that 
these differences matter to us because they affect how those causes can be exploited in the 
course of scientific investigation. Interventionist approaches to causation, especially 
Woodward’s, are based on the notion that causes matter to us largely (or at least partly) 
because only relations that are causal can be exploited for purposes of manipulation or 
control. More than that, however, Woodward argues that our distinguishing ​between 
causes can also be understood with that in mind.  For example, we tend to prefer or 
emphasise highly stable causal relationships over unstable ones because the former are 
more reliable targets for control purposes: intervening on them is more likely to change 
the effect under a range of background circumstances and under a wider range of 
interventions (Woodward 2010, 315; more below). 
Now that we have an interpretation of binding specificity as a causal concept, we 
can interpret the distinctions scientists make between causes based on this property, and 
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their reasons for doing so, as an instance of this same phenomenon of causal selection. 
With that in mind, what is the practical upshot of the causal interpretation of binding 
specificity as outlined in section 3.1? That is, for what purposes do scientists distinguish 
between drugs based on their binding specificity? 
The first and most obvious point on this matter has run through the entire 
discussion: Drugs with low specificityーthose that interact liberally with decoysーare 
likely to produce a host of unwanted side-effects. This point is also made by Woodward: 
Chemotherapy, for example, is far from ideal because it kills healthy cells as well as 
cancer cells, and so the search for better cancer treatments is largely the search for 
treatments that avoid these off-target effects. As well as the negative downstream effects 
they tend to produce, decoy interactions are also to be avoided because they make some 
of the drug unavailable for binding to the target, and so a higher dose is needed to achieve 
the desired outcome. 
Another observation Woodward makes is that while one-one and fine-grained 
specificity are not strictly the same notion, the two are at least interconnected. One reason 
is that cases of fine-grained specificity will also tend to qualify as one-one specific, in that 
each ​value ​of the cause variable tends to cause one and only one value of the effect 
variable. In other words, if we combine a set of one-one specific causes and consider 
them as a single variable, intervening on that variable will allow a variety of fine-grained 
alterations. In the case of drug design, we could interpret this claim in the following way: 
Once we have a range of highly specific drugs at our disposal, we can make a range of 
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fine-grained alterations to physiology by choosing from among that range. To put it the 
other way round, if you want to exert fine-grained control over something, you need a 
toolkit of interventions that are each specific in the one-one sense. However, as we saw in 
section 3.1, binding specificity only really implies that the cause in question produces a 
single effect, not that the effect can only be produced by that cause. This makes sense in 
the case of drug design: it does not affect our evaluation of a drug’s effectiveness that 
there are other drugs that have that effect. 
The above are benefits to one-one specificity in molecular cases that Woodward 
has already identified. The first of these has to do with the aforementioned notion of 
broad specificity: One situation that calls for a drug with a broad specificity profile is 
when the target protein is owned by a rapidly mutating virus. In cases like these, we want 
a drug that can potentially target not just the wild type of the protein, but any mutant 
versions that may arise. This leads to an interesting connection when we interpret this in 
causal terms: In cases like these, the purpose of designing a drug with a broad specificity 
profile is to ensure that the drug’s effect on the virus is highly ​stable​. 
To elaborate: In Woodward’s sense, the stability of a causal relationship is the 
extent to which it continues to hold under a range of changes in background conditions 
(2010, 291). Here a “background condition” has a technical meaning: it is any condition 
not explicitly represented in the particular causal relationship being discussed; in this 
case, the relationship between the administering of the drug and the curing of the 
infection. With that in mind, the form of the protein expressed by the virus qualifies as a 
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“background” condition even though it is the direct target of the drug. Since changes in 
that condition through mutation can change whether or not the drug is effective, then, a 
drug whose specificity profile covers a larger range of possible mutant proteins therefore 
has a more stable causal relationship with the treatment of the infection: it remains 
effective under a wider range of virus mutations. 
 
3.3 The Epistemic Value of Binding Specificity 
 
Finally, there is a second dimension to the scientific importance of binding specificity that 
Woodward does not raise. That is, as well as the various therapeutic benefits to binding 
specificityーthe avoidance of side-effects, the maintenance of stable effects, and so onー
there is also a more directly ​epistemological​ aspect to its value. As we’ve seen, many 
drugs (though not all) are developed with the guidance of knowledge about the causal 
process underlying the disease in questionーfor example, knowledge of the physiological 
processes that the disease disrupts. This informs many decisions about treatment 
strategies, including decisions about which protein to target with a drug in the first place. 
As it happens, molecules with high specificity are not just an ​outcome​ of this process but 
a valuable ​means ​to gaining that causal knowledge in the first place. This is summarised 
neatly by Eaton et al.: “Many ideas about which target is the right one to use to treat a 
particular disease will be wrong, since our understanding of biology is far from perfect; to 
go forward from a right idea or to discard a wrong idea requires data that definitively 
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show that a given compound, which inhibits the activity of its target completely and 
specifically, does or does not affect the course of a disease in an appropriate animal 
model (or in a human clinical trial). The overall process of drug discovery is thus 
facilitated by experiments with highly specific compounds.” (Eaton et al. 1995, 634; 
emphasis added) 
In other words, in order to know that a given target is appropriate for treating a 
disease, one has to manipulate that target (e.g. inhibit it) and see what happens. But to 
know that the observed effects are in fact ​because ​of the inhibition of that particular 
target, one has to be sure that one’s experimental intervention did not also affect other 
things as well; otherwise, the observed effect may be because of those off-target effects 
instead of the intended one. This is why getting reliable data about the etiology of a 
disease, and hence discovering the most appropriate drug target in the first place, is aided 
by the use of compounds with high binding specificity. 
This suggests a deeper interpretation of binding specificity in relation to 
Woodward’s causal framework. Recall that on this framework, causal claims are 
effectively claims about the effects of ideal interventions, which fully and uniquely 
determine the value of their target variable without affecting anything else in the system. 
The interventions built into the meaning of causal claims are called ideal because, in 
reality, it is always at least logically possible that something else that has not been 
explicitly controlled for is affecting the outcome. This is why no experiment we can 
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actually perform to test causal claims yields categorical certainty about it: the best one 
can do is control for as many relevant factors as possible. 
This characterization of ideal interventions is strikingly similar to Eaton et al.’s 
account of the epistemological value of binding specificity. As we’ve seen, the ideally 
specific ligand is one that fully inhibits its target (at a certain concentration) without 
affecting anything else. Given the probabilistic fuzziness of thermodynamics, however, 
this can only ever be an ideal: decoy interactions can be minimized to a tolerable level, 
but never eliminated. Nevertheless, the notion of an ideally specific drug serves as a 
useful guide, to be approached but never reached. 
This analogy leads to a compelling suggestion for how to connect binding 
specificity to Woodwardian causal language: A ligand is specific for its target to the 
extent that its introduction ​approximates an ideal intervention​ on that target. As well as 
the therapeutic benefits to these precise manipulations, their epistemic value as 
highlighted by Eaton et al. neatly exemplifies the more general notion at work in 
Woodward’s analysis of causal claims: the more closely that ideal can be approached, the 
more confidence we have in the accuracy of those causal models in the first place. We can 
potentially generalise this to apply beyond the confines of drug design. The same 
principle applies, for example, to the creation of monoclonal antibodies in fluorescence 
imaging: the specificity of those fluorescent dyes for particular cell components is critical 
for avoiding background noise, thus improving the quality of the images and the 
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reliability of the data. The closer one gets to total specificity, and hence to an ideal 
intervention, the more informative the resulting signal. 
Another case worthy of further study is the use of experimental manipulations 
such as RNA interference: The value of these techniques is in large part the precision 
with which they target specific RNAs in specific tissues, and hence the confidence they 
yield in the causal role of the RNAs being targeted. However, another important source of 
their value is how easy it is to knock down an RNA as long as you know its sequence. As 
we’ve seen, the same is not true of proteins: knowing its primary sequence, or even its 
tertiary structure, leaves much to be done in terms of designing ligands that target it 
specifically. Evidently, there is much more to be explored on these issues outside the 
realm of drug design as well as within it.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this paper I’ve shown that the notion of binding specificity is 1) centrally important to 
molecular biology and related fields, especially to pharmacology and drug design, 2) 
understudied by philosophers, particularly in relation to causation in biology, and 
therefore 3) worthy of more philosophical attention. I described the notion of binding 
specificity as it is understood and aimed for in drug design, including its relationship with 
the embedded concept of affinity, how the two are related both conceptually and 
experimentally, and the various difference-makers that contribute to them. This account 
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reveals a number of observations that are ripe for further study, such as how specificity is 
often sought in ways that are indirect but more practically feasible, or how rational design 
principles can often precede experimentation in achieving it. 
I then developed a ​causal ​ interpretation of binding specificity, elaborating on 
Woodward’s suggestion that it is an instance of the more general notion of one-one causal 
specificity. I broadly supported this interpretation while proposing some amendments 
prompted by the study of its involvement in drug design. This includes qualifying the 
“one-one” condition in two ways: first to accommodate the probabilistic nature of 
molecular interactions, and second to note that specificity claims often tolerate either 
many-to-one or one-to-many relations. 
I have also shown a number of ways in which binding specificity relates to causal 
selection; that is, for why scientists often distinguish between drugs on the basis of that 
causal property. In particular, I’ve pointed out that broad specificity of a drug for its 
target can be conducive to treatments that are causally ​stable​ under mutations in the target 
virus. I’ve also highlighted a link between broad specificity and the causal notion of 
proportionality. 
As well as these therapeutic benefits, I’ve highlighted a critical epistemic 
dimension to why molecules with high binding specificity are valuable: their use in 
experimental interventions provides reliable data about the causal structure being 
investigated in the first place. This point suggests that as well as being viewed as a 
property of causal relations, alongside stability or proportionality, binding specificity may 
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actually be linked to the notion of ideal interventions that are central to the interventionist 
framework as a whole. 
Much of the discussion in this paper has been open-ended: each answer proposed 
raises further questions and invites further study. As well as being inevitable, this is also 
deliberate. As discussed in section 1, the amount of philosophical work investigating the 
role of binding specificity is proportionally tiny relative to the importance of the concept 
in molecular biology and neighbouring disciplines. Hence, as well as its explicit aim of 
understanding binding specificity as a causal concept, this paper has a broader aim of 
inviting further investigation into this concept and its practical and explanatory 
importance. It is evident from what I discuss here that binding specificity presents a vast 
and largely untapped well of resources for philosophers of biology.  
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